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IS WHAT’S YOURS REALLY MINE?: SHMUELI V. 
CORCORAN GROUP AND PENUMBRAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
Lee Nolan Jacobs∗ 
As technology advances, the government has attempted 
to enact policy that protects the delicate balance between 
the demands for technological change and the need to 
protect an individual’s right[s] . . . . As a nation, we have 
supported laws that protect us from our neighbors and our 
government spying on us and invading our privacy, 
everywhere but in the workplace.1 
INTRODUCTION 
As computer use increasingly permeates all aspects of society, 
including both high level and menial employment, the notion of a 
legitimate property right in the ownership of both personal and 
work products is in a state of flux.2 No clear doctrine exists to 
                                                          
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2007; B.A. The George Washington 
University, 2002; M.S. The George Washington University, Information Science 
Technology, 2004. The author wishes to thank his parents, Ilona and Jeffrey 
Jacobs; grandparents, Dorothy and Al Sacks; brothers and sister, Lance and 
Austin Jacobs and Kara and Faran Fagen for their constant love and support. He 
would also like to thank “The Firm,” H.H., and all of his friends that stood by 
him through this entire process.  He would also like to express his gratitude to 
Prof. Wendy Seltzer, Meghan Towers, Jessica Gary, Victoria Szymczak, Kevin 
Morrissey, and the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for all of their 
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1 139 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Paul 
Simon). 
2 H. Joseph Wen and Pamela Gersuny, Computer-Based Monitoring in the 
American Workplace: Surveillance Technologies and Legal Challenges, 24 
HUMAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 165, 166 (2005). As of September 2001, 174 
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determine who maintains the rights to and interests in documents 
created and maintained with the assistance of computer networks.3 
In essence it must be asked, what happens to the employee who is 
able to write the great American novel during his or her unpaid 
break periods, while still satisfying all work requirements? Who 
maintains rights over the document, the employee or employer? 
Under the current law, this writer might not be able to retrieve his 
or her product if he or she was suddenly terminated. That would 
leave the employer with the rights to a document that is clearly not 
within the purview of the business and which belongs to the 
employee. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of New York in Shmueli v. 
Corcoran Group4 ruled that the common law concept of 
conversion can apply when an employer unlawfully takes a former 
independent contractor’s personal electronic documents.5  
                                                          
million people—66% of the U.S. population—were using computers in their 
homes, schools, libraries, and work. In the workplace, 65 million of the 115 
million employed adults age 25 and over, almost 57% used a computer at work. 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE 
EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET (2002). 
3 Throughout this Note’s entirety, the term computer networks will be used 
as a catch-all to describe the tools that an employee uses to create documents. 
This term includes the use of a single computer using basic software 
applications which is not connected to a network of other computers and servers, 
to a fully network integrated environment where users share network resources 
such as file-servers, networked applications, and Internet access. See generally 
JOHN W. SATZINGER ET. AL., SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 302 (2nd ed. 2002) 
(defining a computer network as “a set of transmission lines, equipment and 
communication protocols to permit sharing of information and resources.”). 
4 802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005). This decision is a result of the 
defendant’s (Corcoran Group) motion for summary judgment to dismiss 
Shmueli’s complaint. 
5 Electronic documents refer to any type of file that is kept in an electronic 
format which includes is but not limited to the following: word processing, 
spreadsheets, and images. However, for the purposes of this Note, electronic 
documents will be limited to those documents which could be easily printed on 
paper into a classical tangible form. 
While the handwritten . . . is a ‘literal’ document, the computerized one 
is . . . ‘virtual’ . . . [which can] . . . transform to literal . . . by [using the] 
printing key function . . . Electronically written ‘documents’ should not 
be treated with less dignity . . . than ink written ‘documents.’ The 
JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
 PENUMBRAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 839 
Although this court does hold that an independent contractor’s 
electronic documents are subject to the tort of conversion,6 it does 
not fully explain the application of property rights concerning 
electronic documents between traditional employers and 
employees. 
Currently, federal law and most state law recognizes that all 
employees have a pre-existing personal privacy interest, as well as 
a security interest, in their electronic documents.7 However, the 
law as it stands today affords no property protections over personal 
electronic documents created or maintained by employees on their 
employer’s computer network.  This Note proposes, through 
reasoning by interpolation (or the logical inference making based 
on the comparison of two apparent legal doctrines to create a third) 
as applied at the overlap of privacy and security interests, a 
property right is generated.8 
The New York Supreme Court’s decision in Shmueli represents 
a microcosm of the shortcomings of the current prevailing law. In 
granting an electronic document the same level of protections as its 
hard-copy counterpart, the Shmueli court’s holding keeps the law 
somewhat in step with the pace of technological change.9 
However, as this Note argues, greater continued protection is 
necessary for electronic documents. The decision fails to address 
how computer use has made it far easier for employers to intrude 
upon the privacy rights of employees and thereby infringe on 
employee property rights as well.10 For instance, before computers, 
employees had the ability to lock their documents in a file cabinet, 
                                                          
medium of recordation whether ancient or modern should not be 
deemed germane. 
Id. at 2-4. 
6 Id. 
7 See infra Part III for a further discussion concerning current privacy and 
security protections afforded to employees in the workplace. 
8 See e.g. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably 
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1997). Also see infra Part VI for an 
explanation of reasoning-by-interpolation and its application to an employee’s 
property rights in the workplace. 
9 See infra notes 20-21. 
10 See infra Part II for a further discussion concerning current employee 
monitoring and surveillance practices. 
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and if an employer were to go rifle through that file cabinet, it 
would be fairly easy for the employee to see that something had 
been moved or was missing. With computers, electronic 
monitoring and surveillance gives the employer the ability to 
monitor their employees’ computer and view all files, 
documents—virtually everything that the employee performs on 
his or her computer—without the employee ever even knowing.11 
The court in Shmueli failed to take this into account, and therefore 
is only paying lip service, instead of advancing the law. 
This Note argues that it is inadequate for the law to give 
employees the same amount of property protection over electronic 
documents as over paper documents. As computer usage in the 
workplaces continues to increase and substantially change the 
manner in which work actually takes place, the law must evolve 
and recognize the inherent property right that employees maintain 
over their personal electronic documents. As the rights of 
employees must be balanced against the rights of employers, 
legislatures should consider statutory protections and private 
parties should consider contractual remedies to ensure that the 
rights of all parties—both employers and employees—are 
protected. 
Part I of this Note evaluates Shmueli in the context of the tort 
of conversion contrasted with property and privacy rights. Part II 
addresses methods and rationales of workplace surveillance. 
Further, this section examines “Acceptable Use Agreements,” or 
private contractual agreements entered into by employers and their 
employees which govern the terms and conditions surrounding the 
use of an employer’s computer network. Part III discusses 
applicable state and federal statutes which affect workplace 
monitoring and privacy. Part IV illustrates the standard applied to 
workplace privacy cases surrounding personal electronic 
documents created and maintained in the public sphere by 
analyzing Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General. Parts V and VI 
present the proposition that through reasoning-by-interpolation, 
employees maintain property rights over their documents. Part VII 
suggests statutory and private solutions which support the 
                                                          
11 Id. 
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employer’s desire to maintain a productive work environment 
while taking into consideration the employees’ fundamental 
property rights over their electronic documents. 
I. SHMUELI V. CORCORAN—THE DECISION 
Sarit Shmueli, an independent contractor for the Corcoran 
Group Real Estate Firm, was terminated on March 18, 2002.12  
Shmueli was summoned into her supervisor’s office where she 
received her discharge, and then returned to her desk to collect her 
personal belongings, including personal files stored on her 
computer.13 Specifically, she sought to gain access to an electronic 
contact-list detailing the real estate transactions she had 
participated in, both before and during her tenure at the Corcoran 
Group.14 However, she could not collect her file because her 
computer password15 had been changed.16  The court held that 
Shmueli’s password presumably secured her computer documents 
from being read or sent to others without her consent.17 Shmueli 
never gained access to the file and as a result sued the Corcoran 
Group for conversion—on grounds that this was an unlawful 
taking of her computerized contact-list.18 
In his decision, Justice Herman Cahn relied mainly on New 
York’s common law tort of conversion to deny the defendant’s 
                                                          
12 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group,  802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 A computer password is the unique combination of a “username” and 
“password” which grants a user access to his or her computer and/or network 
resources such as printers, file servers, and other network applications. See 
SATZINGER ET. AL., supra note 3, at 516. 
16 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
17 Id. at 877. The expectation of privacy that a user may have concerning 
the secrecy of his or her password and the documents that he secretly stores with 
that password is not guaranteed. Id. 
18 Id. at 873. Shmueli also sought relief on the following causes of action: 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of bailment, misappropriation 
of proprietary information, and interference with prospective business relations. 
Id. However, these additional claims will not be discussed in this Note. 
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motions for summary judgment.19 In essence, Justice Cahn asked: 
[D]oes the common law tort of conversion become an 
extinct vestige of the past as to documents maintained on a 
computer, merely because traditional definitions of 
documents evolve over time to the point where wood pulp 
is no longer the only required medium upon which to 
record data? Does not the concept of conversion . . . 
[the] . . . wrongful exclusionary retention of an owner’s 
physical property, apply to an electronic record created by a 
plaintiff and maintained electronically as much as it does to 
a paper record so created?20 
To these questions, Justice Cahn held that the common law tort 
of conversion does indeed apply to electronic documents; however, 
he applies old law to new technology.21 The Shmueli opinion traces 
the evolution of conversion in New York from only allowing the 
conversion of tangible property, such as real property, to more 
intangible forms like stock certificates and bank books.22  The 
opinion continues to assert that just as owners still control property 
rights over misplaced tangible property, the same rule applies to 
intangible property. 23 Furthermore, Justice Cahn opined that there 
is no practical reason why the same level of property protections 
should not be applied to both tangible and intangible property.24 
                                                          
19 Id. at 875-76. 
20 Id. at 874-75. 
21 Id. at 876. 
22 “As the nature of personal property evolved to the point where tangible 
documents represented highly valuable rights, such as promissory notes, stock 
certificates, insurance policies, and bank books, the tort of conversion was 
expanded by common law courts to include such documents . . . .” Shmueli v. 
Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct. 2005) relying on Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 242, comment d. 
23 Shmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875 relying on Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co. v. Walston & Co., Inc., 234 N.E.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968) (citation 
omitted) (holding that “an owner does not forfeit his ownership for failure to 
take good care of intangible personal property any more than he forfeits it for 
failure to take good care of his watch.”). 
24 “There should be no reason why [a] practical view should not apply 
equally to the present generation of documents . . . which are just as vulnerable 
to theft and wrongful transfer as paper documents, if, indeed, not even more so.” 
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In upholding the notion that intangible property can be subject 
to conversion, the court relied on two federal cases: Kremen v. 
Cohen25 and Astroworks Inc., v. Astroexhibit, Inc.26 Both cases 
present and defend the proposition that certain types of intangible 
property are susceptible to the tort of conversion despite the 
common law notion that the tort of conversion applies only to 
tangible property.27 In Kremen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explained how tort law once delineated between tangible and 
intangible property28—namely, that conversion was originally a 
remedy for the wrongful taking of another’s tangible property.29 
However, virtually every jurisdiction has discarded this rigid 
limitation to some degree.30  In Astroworks, the Southern District 
of New York held that, while an idea itself is incapable of being 
converted, the tangible expression of an idea is capable of being 
converted.31 Thus, an important aspect of the Kremen and 
Astroworks decisions is the notion that intangible property can be 
converted and its storage, either on paper or in electronic medium, 
is immaterial.32 
Finding the aforementioned federal cases analogous to the 
situation presented in Shmueli, the New York court held that the 
contact-list in question was covered by the common law tort of 
conversion.33 The court believed that if it did not find the contact-
                                                          
Shmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
25 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant was liable for 
the theft of plaintiff’s Internet domain name). 
26 257 F. Supp. 2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reasoning that the plaintiff sued 
former business partner for the conversion of business ideas for his own gain). 
27 See Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 and Astroworks, 257 F. Supp. 2d 609. 
28 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. See also Courtney W. Franks, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: 
Conversion of Intangible Property and the Merger Doctrine in the Wake of 
Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 489, 524 (2005) (stating that “as of 1999, 
every state except North Dakota [had] enacted some legislation addressing 
electronic records . . . indicating the inroads that technology has made on our 
laws and society.”) (citations omitted). 
31 Astroworks, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
32 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003). 
33 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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list convertible, then an entire class of property—electronic 
property—would fail to benefit from remedies of the tort of 
conversion.34 Ultimately, the court held that electronic documents 
should not be excluded from the remedies of conversion suits just 
because a document was kept in electronic format rather than on 
paper.35 In essence, Justice Cahn attempted to keep the law in 
check with the pace of technological change, but failed to actually 
do so. Rather than apply antiquated standards to a new breed of 
property, the court should have continued its forward-thinking 
policy and applied new law and new criterion to new technology. 
Although Justice Cahn ultimately concluded that Shmueli did 
maintain property rights over her electronic contact-list, the 
holding is limited to the specific facts of this case.36 Most notably, 
the court’s reliance on the fact that Shmueli was an independent 
contractor likely signifies that the holding is inapplicable to 
employees in general.37 In essence, the court is only helping Sarit 
Shmueli retrieve her document, and is providing little guidance to 
employers or employees on how to settle issues involving property 
rights over personal documents kept at work.38 Under the holding 
in Shmueli, employees in traditional “at-will” work relationships 
have no rights to secure their personal electronic documents.39 
Limiting the Shmueli holding to the specific facts of the case 
forecloses any and all possible remedies for potential-plaintiff “at-
will” employees who are aware that their electronic documents 
have been taken as well as those who are unaware that their 
documents have been taken.40 
                                                          
34 Id. at 877. Justice Cahn continued to opine that the public would perceive 
that the law would be unable to evolve at the same pace as technology. Id. 
35 Id. at 876 n.4. 
36 Id. at 876. 
37 Id. at 876 n.5. “The within holdings are not intended to extend to cases 
involving employees (as opposed to independent contractors), as it is generally 
held that an employee’s work product is proprietary to the employer.” Id. 
38 Id. at 876. 
39 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 n.5 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
40 Id. See infra Part II for a further discussion concerning how current 
technology affords the possibility that documents could be taken from an owner 
without their consent. Furthermore, the tort of conversion may be an unavailable 
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II. WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE 
Although Shmueli supports the proposition that electronic 
documents are susceptible to the tort of conversion,41 the opinion 
lacks guidance on how employers can balance the need to protect 
company work product while shielding themselves from a 
conversion suit for an employee’s personal property. Without 
proper guidelines as to who maintains property rights over 
electronic documents created or maintained on a computer, 
employers have begun electronically monitoring their employees 
in an effort to protect company work product.42 Electronic 
surveillance comes in many different shapes and sizes, some of 
which is regulated by contracts between employers and employees. 
The sheer act of monitoring and the later taking of an employee’s 
document is in effect how employers usurp an employee’s property 
right over the electronic document. 
A. How and Why Monitoring Takes Place 
Lurking behind the computer that an employee uses is a set of 
eyes that is able to monitor almost everything that takes place 
during the work day.43 The most common methods of general 
workplace surveillance include: recording and reviewing 
employees’ telephone conversations; storing and reviewing 
employees’ voicemail messages, computer files, and e-mail 
                                                          
remedy for employees whose documents are taken without their knowledge or 
for those employees who are aware that their documents have been taken, but 
who suffer no damage or losses. However, employees may be able to claim a 
lesser tort, such as trespass to chattels. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
Conversion (8th. ed. 2004) (“The wrongful possession . . . of another’s property 
as if it were one’s own; an act or series of acts of willful interference, without 
lawful justification, with an item of property in a manner inconsistent with 
another’s right, whereby that other person is deprived of the use and possession 
of the property.”), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, Trespass (8th. Ed. 2004) 
(“The act of committing, without lawful justification, any act of direct physical 
interference with a chattel possessed by another.”). 
41 Shmueli, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
42 See infra Part II.A. 
43 See Wen, supra note 2, at 166. 
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messages; monitoring employees’ Internet connections; and 
videotaping employees in the work environment.44  Rather than 
passively copying the files, emails, or telephone calls that a user 
may make, employers in a networked environment can actively 
monitor everything that employees do at their computer. 45 This 
happens without an employee’s knowledge because employers 
utilize such methods as keystroke monitoring,46 events timeline 
logging,47 application usage tracking,48 window activity tracing,49 
and remote desktop viewing50 which are not evident to users of the 
computer. 
On the surface, companies may present plausible reasons for 
monitoring their employees, such as the protection of propriety 
information or the prevention of sexual harassment.51 However, 
employee monitoring has generated apprehension from various 
groups, including libertarians, corporations, and labor unions.52 
                                                          
44 AMA RESEARCH, 2001 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE MONITORING & 
SURVEILLANCE (American Management Association 2001), http://www. 
amanet.org/research/pdfs/ems_short2001.pdf. 
45 See SATZINGER ET. AL., supra note 3, at 302. 
46 Wen, supra note 2, at 167. A keystroke is the action of striking a key on 
the keyboard and keystroke monitoring “maintains a record of [those] 
keystrokes along with the window they are typed in and time stamp.” Id. 
Keystroke monitoring also allows an employee to “recreate a ‘deleted’ 
document because the keystrokes are logged and stored even if deleted.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
47 Timeline logging records all events users performed and allows the 
viewing of all events in a chronological order as well as the ability to track all 
program initiations, website visits, document viewings and printings. Id. 
48 Application usage monitors and logs all applications ran by users as well 
as when it was started, stopped, and how long it was used. Id 
49 Window activity records all documents and files opened and viewed by 
users as well as all windows in which the user directly interacts with on the 
desktop, chat sessions, and username and password combinations. Id. 
50 Remote desktop viewing “takes snapshots of every desktop at set 
intervals of time, allowing managers to virtually see what is happening . . . [and 
allows for the] . . . remote view[ing of] what the user is doing in real-time.” Id. 
51 See Shari C. Lewis, Internet Monitoring: Wide Implications in Ruling on 
Employee Visits to Pornographic Sites, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 7, 2006, at col. 
1. 
52 Wen, supra note 2, at 166. 
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Each argument put forth by these different groups opposing 
employee surveillance relies on varied ethical, legal, or economic 
arguments which present managerial and moral dilemmas.53 
Despite the lack of a conclusive argument in favor of employee 
surveillance, employers continue to proffer various important 
reasons for favoring monitoring. For example, the taping of certain 
activities54 in regulated industries affords both the consumer and 
the company some legal protection, while the sheer act itself may 
merely be the simplest way for a company to maintain adequate 
business records.55 Other employers report that they monitor their 
employees in order to keep the company’s proprietary information 
secure because e-mail and Internet access can easily permit the 
information to leave company walls.56 Joseph Wen and Pamela 
Gersung, noted organizational business scholars, report that 
disgruntled employees have the ability 
to e-mail trade secrets and confidential documents quickly 
and easily to a large audience. . . . [I]n fact, most security 
breaches come from knowledgeable insiders—not random 
hackers from the outside. By monitoring . . . usage and 
content, corporations argue that they are able to detect and 
halt security breaches. Plus the mere knowledge of 
increased surveillance may deter potential employee theft.57 
In total, more than three quarters of major U.S. firms record 
and review the actions of their employees.58 These employers posit 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 Employers can raise an affirmative defense against sexual harassment, 
when the company monitors the computer network to prevent the creation of a 
hostile work environment. Furthermore, states such as New Jersey are now 
mandating that “an employer who is on notice that one of its employees is using 
a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has a 
duty to investigate the employee’s activities and to take prompt and effective 
action to stop the unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent third-
parties.” Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
55 AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1. 
56 Id. 
57 Wen, supra note 2, at 167. 
58 AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1. The American Management 
Association’s survey of workplace surveillance included data from almost 1,700 
major U.S. firms. More than 75% of responding firms gross more than $50 
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that businesses that do not adequately monitor their systems leave 
themselves open to the unlawful and undiscovered loss or 
modification of proprietary business information.59 
In addition to protecting proprietary information from abuse 
and theft, monitoring employee work performance allows 
employers to secure increased employee productivity; objective 
job performance-related decisions concerning hiring, firing and 
promotions, as well as liability protection from sexual harassment 
charges.60 Most commonly, the decision to monitor frequently 
occurs because an employer desires to limit the amount of time 
their employees spend utilizing the computer for personal uses, 
such as sending personal e-mails or browsing the Internet.61 
Employers recognize that each moment spent using the company 
computer for personal use is a waste of the company’s time and 
money.62 Furthermore, the ability of employees with Internet 
access to use instant messaging services,63 send personal emails, or 
participate in chatrooms64 has caused the computer to top the 
coffee room or talking on the telephone as the largest waste of an 
employee’s on-the-job time.65  The average American worker 
                                                          
million in annual sales. Moreover, 13% of respondents gross annually more than 
one billion dollars. Id. at 2. Furthermore, an additional study in 2003, found that 
92% of employers reported that they utilize some form of electronic surveillance 
to monitor their employees. CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS, Survey: ‘You’ve 
Got Mail . . . And the Boss Knows’” (Bentley College) (2003). 




63 Instant messaging (“IM”) software “allows users to send brief remarks 
that pop up on the recipient’s computer screen.” Frank C. Morris Jr. & Jennifer 
S. Recine, The Electronic Platform: The Implications of Technology in the 
Workplace, SK033 ALI-ABA 875, 892 (2004). In 2001, Americans spent over 
4.9 billion minutes per month instant messaging one another, and “likely at least 
doubled over the next two years.” Id. 
64 Chatrooms allow users to “instantly communicate with each other by 
typing a message that is instantly transmitted to others participating in the 
chatroom.” Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: Do 
Students Shed Their Constitutional Rights When Communicating to a Cyber-
Audience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 589 n.15 (2005). 
65 Wen, supra note 2, at 167-68. A 2005 survey revealed that “American 
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admits to wasting 2.09 hours per eight-hour workday, not 
including lunch and other breaks.66 Surfing the Internet was the 
largest time wasting activity, with almost 45% of all respondents 
reporting that they waste time at work browsing the Internet.67 In 
total, almost $340 billion per year will be spent on paying workers 
for surfing the Internet while at work.68 Additionally, because 
electronic monitoring and surveillance is objective,69 it allows for 
employee evaluations and decisions concerning promotions and 
terminations based on the results—free from prejudice, favoritism, 
or other subjective reasons.70  Objective decisions discourage 
disgruntled or former employees from claiming unfair treatment or 
wrongful termination.71 
Besides the need to protect the corporation itself, in terms of 
trade secrets or productivity, businesses and corporations 
nowadays must take a proactive approach to protecting their 
employees from sexual harassment by other employees, as 
                                                          
workers are wasting more than twice the time Human Resource managers 
expect.” Dan Malachowski, Wasted Time at Work Costing Companies Billions, 




68 In total, $759 billion will be spent on paying employees salary for 
expected work which will never be preformed. The total of $340 billion was 
arrived at by taking the total amount spent, $759 billion divided by 44.7%, the 
percentage of browsing the Internet, which equals $339.9 billion. See id. 
Regionally, employees waste the most amount of time in the Midwest, while the 
least amount of time in the South. Overall, employees who reside in Missouri, 
Indiana, and Kentucky waste the most amount of time, as compared to residents 
of South Carolina, Rhode Island and Hawaii who waste the least. An average 
employee of Missouri, Indiana, and Kentucky wastes 3.2, 2.8, and 2.8 hours 
respectively, whereas residents of South Carolina, Rhode Island and Hawaii 
waste only 1.3 hours per working day. Id. Workers in California on average 
waste almost two and a half hours per day of work time wasting almost $38 
billion, while New York employers pay their employees more than $25 billion 
per year for their wasted time at work. Id. 
69 R.L. Worsnop, Privacy In the Workplace, CQ RESEARCHER, Nov. 11, 19, 
1993, at 1011-25. 
70 Wen, supra note 2, at 168. 
71 Id. 
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opposed to the previous reactive practice of addressing claims of 
sexual harassment only after the alleged incidents occurred.72 One 
method of preventing sexual harassment fostered by a hostile work 
environment is to monitor the company’s computer networks for 
potentially offensive or explicit material.73 Electronic monitoring 
and surveillance can “catch” offensive or explicit materials before 
they can be transmitted.74 More or less, the issue comes down to a 
question of duty, that is, in which situations the employer must 
monitor in order to protect its own interests. In Doe v. XYC Corp, a 
recent decision by the New Jersey Superior Court, the court relied 
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that the employer 
must control an employee, even while the employee is not acting 
within the scope of his or her employment, in order to ensure that 
other employees are not harmed.75 The court went so far as to hold 
that “[n]o privacy interest of the employee stands in the way of this 
duty on the part of the employer.”76 
Thus, companies engage in surveillance for various reasons 
ranging from legal compliance and liability, to security concerns.77 
Whether the company engages in monitoring to protect the 
company itself or its protected proprietary information, companies 
employ various modes and methods of monitoring their 
employees’ electronic actions taking place on the company 
computer network. Although the employer’s justification may be 
clear as to why, where, when and how monitoring should take 
place, the sheer act of monitoring itself still continues to raise 
questions of fairness and privacy, and in essence forces employers 
to serve two masters—the interests of the company and the 
interests of its employees. 
                                                          
72 Id. at 167-68. See also Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 2005). 
73 Wen, supra note 2, at 168. 
74 Id. 
75 Doe, 887 A.2d at 1168. 
76 Id. 
77 AMA RESEARCH, supra note 44, at 1. 
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B. Monitoring—Serving Two Masters 
Businesses monitor while serving two masters—the company 
itself, and its employees.78 Monitoring protects the corporation by 
ensuring employee productivity and the security of proprietary 
information.79 However, monitoring creates the perception of a 
diminished sense of employee trust because of jeopardized 
employee privacy.80 When monitoring takes place, two needs must 
be reconciled—the need to protect company information and 
resources while maintaining employee morale and trust.81 
Almost twenty years ago, the federal government recognized 
the growing need to study the amount of workplace surveillance, 
and as a result, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
published The Electronic Supervisor.82  This book forecasted the 
effects of workplace supervision in the face of the increasing use 
of technology.83  Even twenty years ago, the federal government 
acknowledged that by monitoring employees, questions will be 
raised relating to technology and its effects on “privacy, civil 
liberties, and quality of working life.”84 
Privacy in the workplace is the “right to be left alone and to not 
                                                          
78 John J. Sheridan, Minimizing the Risk of Security Threats to Proprietary 
Information, 29 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS TODAY 41 (2003). Sheridan argues 
that 
a company’s true competitive advantage lies in its people. Whether 
they are customer service representatives . . . or CEOs, people make 
things happen. But in order to elicit the best work there must be a free 
exchange of information . . . [which] . . . can be accomplished only if 
there is an established trust that proprietary information will remain 
confidential. 
Id. at 41. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. 
82 U.S. Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC 
SUPERVISOR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS (U.S. Government Printing 
Office 1987). 
83 Id. at 1. 
84 Id. 
JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
852 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
be intruded upon.”85 However, the OTA noted that electronic 
monitoring creates in employees a constant feeling of “being 
watched” different from the temporary reactions generated when a 
supervisor is monitoring in person.86 Workers who are continually 
monitored report feelings of paranoia and increased negative health 
side effects.87 Companies that constantly monitor their employees 
destroy the innate sense of trust and cooperation that keeps a 
company and its employees together.88 Studies have shown that 
monitoring in the workplace can cause stress-related illnesses and 
negative psychological effects.89 Specifically, employees who are 
monitored describe a decline in workplace productivity and morale 
caused from increased occupational health problems, tension and 
anxiety.90 These problems ultimately result in increased operating 
costs for the company and lower workforce productivity.91 
Even though companies are aware of surveillance’s negative 
effects, they still continue to monitor in order to protect the 
company. An example of the severe effects of computer 
surveillance and its repercussions took place at the New York 
Times in 2001.92 After an employee complained of receiving an 
                                                          
85 Id. at 8. 
86 Id. 
87 Hazel Oliver, Email and Internet Monitoring in the Workplace: 
Information Privacy and Contracting-Out, 31 INDUS. L.J. 321 (2002). In 1993, 
the American Civil Liberties Union reported that workplace stress costs 
American companies almost $50 billion per year in increased health costs and 
lost productivity. 139 CONG. REC. S6122, S6123. (daily ed., May 19, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Simon). 
88 Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law 
Allow Private-Sector Employers to Read Their Employee’s E-Mail?, 20 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 165, 167 n.18 (1998). 
89 Oliver, supra note 87, at 32. 
90 Beeson, supra note 88, at 167 n.18. 
91 See generally id. 
92 James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 
169 (2001). However, most companies report that the total number of 
investigations that actually take place, as compared to the total number of 
employees with access to the Internet, computer files, or emails, is rather small. 
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: COMPUTER-USE MONITORING AND 
POLICIES OF SELECTED COMPANIES 8 (2002). 
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offensive e-mail, the Times, without notice to its employees, 
proceeded to scan every computer and its contents within the 
corporate office.93 The search revealed items ranging from 
tasteless jokes to pornography.94 As a result, almost 10% of New 
York Times employees of one particular department were 
summarily terminated while others were reprimanded and 
warned.95 Nonetheless, in spite of all of these negative 
consequences and plausible fair reasoning behind electronic 
monitoring, employers still monitor under the charge, “You can—
and should—monitor.”96 
The evidence is clear: monitoring is a necessary corporate tool 
to protect the corporation.97 However, compelling facts show that 
the act of monitoring is not protecting employees, but is rather 
hurting them physically, psychologically, and socially.98 Yet, 
surveillance can be tempered, and indeed serve the needs of both 
the company and the employee, through the utilization of 
agreements which clearly set out the guidelines and expectations of 
both parties. 
C. Acceptable Computer/Network Use Policies 
Employers have recognized the sheer amount of inherent risk 
involved with computers in the workplace.99 Thus, employers have 
begun to institute Acceptable Use Policies (AUP), which set forth 
                                                          
93 Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at 170. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. Similar occurrences happened at Dow Chemical and Xerox. In 1999, 
Xerox fired more than 40 employees for viewing pornographic websites for 
almost eight hours a day. William G. Porter & Michael C. Griffaton, Between 
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Monitoring the Electronic Workplace, 70 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 65, 76 (2003). In 2000, Dow Chemical fired 74 employees, including 
executives, and punished 435 others for distributing and viewing sexually 
explicit and violent materials via company e-mail. Rosenbaum, supra note 92, at 
170. 
96 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, You & the Law: 
Quick, Easy-to-Use Advise on Employment 2 (2002). 
97 See supra Part II.A. 
98 Oliver, supra note 87. 
99 See supra Part II.A. 
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permissible and prohibited computer, network, and Internet 
usage.100 An AUP is an agreement signed by employee and 
employer which contains guidelines of how an employee can 
access and use the employer’s computer system.101 AUPs also set 
forth appropriate computer behavior,102 use,103 and governance 
responsibilities of both management and employees.104 AUPs are 
designed to protect both the employer and employee because they 
prevent an employee from claiming a privacy violation by clearly 
stating the expectations and responsibilities.105 Employees are 
explicitly aware of their expected computer use behavior, while 
these policies reaffirm the employer’s right to monitor the 
employee’s use of company computers by explaining acceptable 
computer use, and placing employees on notice of the penalties for 
misuse.106 In essence, by instituting usage guidelines, supervisors 
inform their employees of what conduct is approved and forbidden 
on the corporate computer network.107 In general, an AUP should 
explain what type of data will be monitored, why surveillance is 
necessary, and how and when the surveillance will take place.108 
Furthermore, the policy should clearly inform employees of what 
the repercussions will be if they break the rules.109 Also, it should 
                                                          
100 FPMI COMMUNICATIONS, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: MANAGING 
CYBERSPACE IN THE WORKPLACE (2000). 
101 Id. at 149. The policy usually includes the requirements for user’s logon 
information and its maintenance. See supra note 9, for further discussion 
concerning a user’s logon information. 
102 SCOTT BARRMAN, WRITING INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES 150 
(2002). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 150-53. 
105 Id at 48. 
106 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 9. 
107 BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 150. 
108 Id. at 152. 
109 Porter, supra note 95, at 75. Some sample provisions that might be 
included in an AUP under use guidelines are as follows: 
(1) Systems and network are to be used for business purposes only. 
Incidental personal use is permitted as long as it is not more than a 
trivial amount of time and does not interfere with your tasks. 
(2) Users may not use the systems, network, or Internet connection to 
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be noted that like other contracts which are unfairly slanted toward 
the person or corporation writing the contract, if an AUP does not 
contain the employer’s responsibilities as a part of fair bargain, 
courts will invalidate it as unfair.110 
The use of AUPs is now common and widespread and in 2002, 
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) addressed the 
almost ubiquitous use of AUPs by filing a report with the House of 
Representatives Committee on Education and the Workforce’s 
Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness.111  The report 
focuses on how the wide discretion private employers have in their 
ability to monitor what their employees are doing on the computer 
network impacts the workplace.112 Private employers enjoy overly 
broad discretion because of the wide variance in federal and state 
laws, as well as differing judicial decisions.113 The GAO surveyed 
fourteen Fortune 1000 private sector companies spanning five 
different industries.114 The survey found that all of the companies 
                                                          
play games. 
(3) Users are reminded that organizational information is proprietary 
and may not be shared with any outsider. 
(4) Users are reminded that Internet connections are not private. While 
online, users must be careful as to what they disclose to others. Users 
should refrain from sending out any information that may be damaging 
to the organization or themselves. 
Id. at 150-51. 
110 BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 151. 
111 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92. 
112 Id. at 1. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2. The GAO surveyed fourteen companies from the financial 
services, general services, manufacturing, professional services, and 
wholesale/retail industries, involving interviews with representatives from the 
general counsel’s office, human resource departments, as well as internal audit 
and computer security administrators. Id. These administrators further reported 
that a successful AUP depends on its successful implementation. The following 
list, selections from, the Ten Commandments for Avoiding Workplace E-
xposure, has become the standard-bearer of what steps should be taken to secure 
the successful implementation of an AUP: 
1) Publish policies regarding employee use of e-mail, the Internet, 
instant messaging and any employer issued hardware or software . . . . 
JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
856 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
had some form of AUP that informed employees that there is no 
expectation of privacy while using the corporate computer 
network.115 Experts agree that employers should notify employees 
of the organization’s responsibilities and disclose what will be 
                                                          
2) Secure employee acknowledgement of each of these policies in 
writing or electronically at hire or promulgation and preferably re-
execute or bring to employees’ attention on a regular periodic basis. 
3) Inform all employees of the employer’s explicit intention to monitor 
e-mail, Internet use and any other use of employer issued computers 
and electronic devices as deemed necessary for business purposes. 
Include the right to inspect any hardware issued to employees. Be sure 
to update the list of hardware items. 
4) Train all employees on how to write appropriate business e-mails. 
Evidence suggests that you cannot assume that even high-ranking 
officials know how to use e-mail appropriately in a business 
setting . . . . 
. . . . 
6) Create a written document retention policy that includes monthly or 
semi-monthly deletion of e-mails. Include a policy of recycling backup 
tapes. Be sure that any document retention policy complies with 
any . . . legislation or [court] rulings . . . . 
7) Inform all employees of your intention to turn over any evidence of 
possible legal wrongdoing to the authorities. Also stress that you will 
cooperate with law enforcement officials seeking evidence of illegal 
activity, including evidence of terrorist related activities. 
8) Be sure to enforce all policies. Do so in an even-handed manner that 
treats employees of all levels similarly. Note any exceptions to the 
policy. 
9) Keep current on new technology in the market place. Assess how 
new software, hardware or innovations in devices issued to or owned 
by employees may be affecting the workplace. 
10) Re-evaluate all technology-related policies annually, adjust them as 
necessary and inform employees of any changes and secure their 
affirmative consent to any important change. 
Morris Jr., supra note 63, at 913. 
115 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 10. The GAO continued to 
report that “courts have consistently upheld companies’ monitoring practices 
where the company has a stated policy that employees have no expectation of 
privacy on company computer systems.” Id. 
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monitored, while making clear that no expectation of privacy exists 
while using a company computer.116 In the face of the amount of 
monitoring that takes place and the lack of statutory guidance, 
Congress and varied state legislatures have begun to make strides 
at providing business with limitations and procedures as to how 
and when monitoring can take place in the workplace which 
together with an employee’s right of privacy and security of 
documents lead to an ultimate right of property. 
 
III. WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE STATUTES 
In response to increasing workplace surveillance, attempts have 
recently been made to ensure a worker’s right to privacy in the 
workplace.117 However, a dichotomy exists within the current 
law.118 Both federal and state law grant a modicum of privacy 
rights to public employees over their work and communications.119 
Unfortunately, because no federal law exists to provide employees 
and employers in the private sector with uniform standards 
concerning the ownership of electronic documents, companies 
must rely on piecemeal state statutes which vary from state to state, 
if they exist at all. As a result the private sector utilizes 
employment procedures, manuals, and privacy agreements to 
preserve an employee’s privacy and the employer’s work 
                                                          
116 BARRMAN, supra note 102, at 150. The GAO observed that: 
Some companies directly inform employees that they should under no 
circumstances expect privacy. For example, once policy stated, “All 
users should understand that there is not right or reasonable expectation 
of privacy in any e-mail messages on the company’s system.” 
Somewhat less explicit, another policy stated, “Our personal privacy is 
not protected on these systems, and we shouldn’t expect it to be.” Some 
companies generally implied the principle of “no expectation of 
privacy” with statements like, “[company] reserves the right to audit, 
access, and inspect electronic communications and data stored or 
transmitted on its Computer Resources. 
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 12. 
117 See Wen, supra note 2, at 166. 
118 See infra Part III.A-B. 
119 See infra Part III.A-B. 
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product.120 The current state of the law regarding employee 
surveillance is “an amalgam of legislation, federal and state, that 
resonates against a body of state common law governing individual 
dignitary interests—the torts of defamation, infliction of emotional 
distress, and invasion of privacy—the content of which can vary 
considerably from state to state.”121 
A. State Statutes 
Reacting to the possibility that computer surveillance will 
allow employers to exploit their employees’ privacy,122 state 
legislatures have begun to address the issue that as the use of more 
sophisticated technology in the workplace increases, so does the 
risk of employer abuse.123 Although states have previously passed 
legislation to protect individuals and corporations from computer 
crimes such as identity theft and hacking,124 the past three years 
have seen a watershed movement for states to attempt to protect 
the electronic communications, and thereby the privacy, of private 
                                                          
120 See infra Part III.B. 
121 Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: 
The United State Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 472 (2002). 
122 See generally Harvard Law Review Association, Addressing the New 
Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991) 
(forecasting that although federal and state legislatures have addressed computer 
crime, in 1991, there was a lack of protection for employees from employer 
abuse of privacy rights infringement). 
123 Id. at 1899. States across the nation have made various attempts to pass 
legislation to protect employees. In 1997, the Georgia Assembly proposed the 
Georgia Privacy for Consumers Workers Act, which would have required 
employers to notify employees when and why workplace surveillance was 
taking place. HB 566 Ga. 1997 (proposed in 1997) (as of the date of publication, 
this bill was not carryovered from the 1997 session). In 2001, The California 
Legislature, submitted for a third time to Governor Gray Davis, a law which 
would have required employers to give employees notice of electronic 
monitoring. See Wen, supra note 2, at 170. The Massachusetts Senate in 2005, 
proposed the Communication and Information Privacy Act which would have 
also required employers to notify employees when they are being monitored. 
2005 Mass. S.D. 1117 (proposed Jan 05) (as of the date of publication, this bill 
is still in Mass. Senate Committee). 
124 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122. 
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citizens in the workplace.125 Recently, states such as Florida, 
Connecticut, and Delaware have taken steps to protect workers’ 
privacy by enacting various statutes.126 Although each statute was 
designed to protect consumers and businesses from electronic 
communications fraud, or individuals from wiretapping, each state 
also included employee protections from secret monitoring by their 
employers.127 
In 1978, Florida led the nation by becoming the first state to 
pass statutes that allowed corporations and businesses to seek a 
legal remedy for acts of computer crime.128 In doing so, the Florida 
Legislature took the first steps toward protecting an employee’s 
electronic communication at work; that protection was finally 
secured in 2003 when the Florida Legislature passed the Security 
of Communications Act.129 Under the statute, it is a felony to 
“intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept . . . any wire, oral, 
or electronic communications.”130 However, interception is 
allowed if it takes place during the normal course of employment, 
while engaged in any activity that is a necessary incident to the 
rendition of his or her service, such as in the service of police 
investigatory work.131 Therefore, in Florida, if an employer 
electronically monitors its employees, the interception of any email 
or Internet usage must take place in the normal course of business 
and be done in order to secure the employer’s property rights.132 
                                                          
125 See infra notes 129-141 for a further discussion. 
126 See infra notes 129-141 for a further discussion. 
127 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (2003) and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
31-48d (2005). 
128 See Florida Computer Crimes Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.01-.07 (1976 
& Supp. 1991). 
129 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(1) (2003). 
130 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.03(1)(a) (2003). 
131 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.03(1)(e)-(g)(2003). Although statutes exist on 
both the federal and state level that prevent wiretapping, this section of this 
statue specifically protects communications in the private workplace. Id. 
132 Wen, supra note 2, at 170. Further, it should be noted that in Florida, an 
employer would be able to employ the monitoring tools discussed earlier, see 
supra Part III.A, to protect against the theft of proprietary information or suit 
liability, for instance from sexual harassment. Otherwise, under Florida statute, 
an employer has no right to monitor the work of his employees without the 
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Following Florida’s lead, in 2001, Delaware passed a statute 
requiring all employers, both public and private, to notify their 
employees of monitoring.133 Under this provision, “no 
employer . . . shall monitor or otherwise intercept any telephone 
conversation or transmission, electronic mail or transmission, or 
Internet access or usage . . . unless the employer has provided 
some form of notice to the employee.”134 Notice is effectuated by 
either (1) providing an electronic notice of monitoring to an 
employee at least once a day when the employee accesses 
electronic resources, or (2) giving the employee a one-time written 
notice concerning the scope and types of monitoring.135 The 
written notice must be maintained and securely kept by the 
company and both the employee and supervisor must consent.136 
In 2003, Connecticut passed the Communications Technology 
in the Workplace Act.137 Connecticut’s statute only permits the 
gathering of information detailing an employee’s activities through 
direct observation.138 Employers are defined as any business that 
operates within the state—both public and private.139 However, if 
an employer provides written notice to an employee of all forms of 
monitoring, both through direct and electronic surveillance that is 
taking place, and posts notice in a conspicuous place, monitoring is 
allowed.140 
B. Federal Statutes 
The federal government has done little lately to protect the 
rights of individuals from secret electronic monitoring. The 
                                                          
written consent of all parties engaged in the monitoring—both employee and 
supervisors. Wen, supra note 2, at 170. 
133 19 DEL. C. § 705 (2005). 
134 19 DEL. C. § 705(b) (2005). 
135 Id. 
136 19 DEL. C. § 705(b)(1)(2) (2005). 
137 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (2005). 
138 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(a)(3) (2005). 
139 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(a)(1) (2005). 
140 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2005). 
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986141 (ECPA) stands 
as the controlling legislation that “prohibits the interception, 
disclosure, or use of wire, oral or electronic communication.”142 
Congress twice attempted to pass more comprehensive and 
protective pieces of legislation: in 1990 the Privacy for Consumers 
and Workers Act143 (PCWA) and in 2000 the Notice of Electronic 
Monitoring Act144 (NEMA). However, both of these Congressional 
attempts have failed,145 and to date, only the twenty-year-old 
ECPA provides protections to employees who are being 
monitored.146 
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act147 
Fifteen years ago, the Harvard Law Review Association argued 
that laws designed to protect individuals and companies from 
computer crimes were not enough to protect employees from abuse 
by their employers148—specifically referring to the Electronic 
Communications Act of 1986.149 Harvard raised the following 
“age-old workplace” conflict in light of the ECPA—”how much 
access employers should have to their employees’ workspace, and 
how much freedom employees should have to use workplace 
                                                          
141 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 
(1986), 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter ECPA]. 
142 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, Privacy Under Siege: Electronic 
Monitoring in the Workplace 14 (2005), available at http://www.workrights. 
org/issue_electronic/NWI_EM_Report.pdf. 
143 Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act of 1990, H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 
1990). 
144 Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 
2000). 
145 See infra Part III.B.1-3. 
146 See infra Part III.B.1. 
147 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986). 
148 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1899. 
149 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848. The Act was 
originally passed into law as an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1986. NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 
14 
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resources for their own purposes.”150 The ECPA prohibits the 
“interception and disclosure of wire, oral or electronic 
communication, with certain exceptions.”151 The protections 
afforded by the ECPA apply to all businesses involved in interstate 
commerce.152 
The Act as originally passed in 1986 deals only with the 
electronics, technology and circumstances contemporary to its 
time. The main focus and purpose of this law is to protect 
businesses and corporations from computer crime and individuals 
from wiretapping.153 This focus is biased in favor of the employer, 
and the only remedy given to employees is the common law tort of 
invasion of privacy.154 However, proving the tort of invasion of 
privacy is a difficult task to undertake because an employee has to 
first show that the company’s interception of his or her 
communication could not be excused as a legitimate business 
practice.155 Then the employee has to prove that his or her 
communication was never intended to be distributed to the public, 
let alone to his or her employer.156 Furthermore, the employee 
must demonstrate that a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
communication existed.157 
2. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act158 
In 1990, Senator Paul Simon and Representative Pat Williams 
introduced the PWCA, respectively, in the United States Senate 
and House of Representatives.159 From 1990 to 1993, Sen. Simon, 
                                                          
150 Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1911. 
151 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 14. 
152 Id. at 14. 
153 See ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848. 
154 Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 122, at 1911. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. However, public sector employees are virtually barred from claiming 
Fourth Amendment violations because it is nearly impossible to prove the 
elements of privacy and reasonableness. Id. 
158 H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990). 
159 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19. 
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Rep. Williams, and over 150 bipartisan cosponsors continued to 
reintroduce the bill after each failed attempt to bring the bill out of 
committee and onto the floor for a full vote in each respective 
chamber.160 The PCWA would have provided employees with a 
“right to know” when and where monitoring would take place and 
mandated advanced notice of what would be collected and how it 
would be used.161 Sen. Simon characterized the unrestrained 
surveillance of workers as turning the “modern office into [an] 
electronic sweatshop.”162 
The PCWA would have required employers to allow their 
workers to have unfettered access to the data that was collected 
through workplace surveillance.163 Under this law, employers 
would have to set out their policies and inform prospective 
employees of their monitoring practices.164 Furthermore, the 
PCWA would have prohibited companies from storing, gathering, 
utilizing, or distributing data obtained by electronic surveillance.165 
It would also require that employers inform their employees when 
monitoring is actually taking place through a signal light, beeping 
tone, verbal notification, or other forms of notification.166 A crucial 
issue in the PCWA was that an employee would never be able to 
waive his or her First Amendment rights.167 If an employer were to 
enter into a private agreement concerning approved computer 
network usage, that agreement could never take away his or her 
protected constitutional right of freedom of expression.168 
When the proposed legislation was first debated in committee, 
Senator Simon characterized employee monitoring as an 
                                                          
160 Id. 
161 139 CONG. REC. S2430 (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Simon). 
162 Id. 
163 H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990). 
164 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19. 
165 H.R. 2168 (1st Sess. 1990). 
166 137 CONG. REC. E709 (daily ed., March 1, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
Williams). 
167 Id. 
168 See id. (stating that the act “prohibits the waiver of rights and 
procedures provided by this act.”). 
JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
864 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
“electronic whip that drives the fast pace of today’s workplace.”169 
He stated, that “it is an unfortunate irony that the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation is required to obtain a court order to wiretap a 
telephone, even in cases of national security, but that employers 
are permitted to spy at will on their own personnel and the 
public.”170 He also noted at the time, that the United States and 
South Africa were the only countries that failed to have some of 
protections that safeguarded an employee’s privacy in the 
workplace.171 At the time, the PCWA’s opponents were 
successfully able to argue the PCWA’s impracticality and 
ineffectiveness in face of tort law and other remedies.172 During 
the PCWA’s final debate, Sen. Simon prophesized that: 
Just over the horizon are more technology 
breakthroughs and refinements that we can’t even envision 
today. Unless we begin now to define privacy—and in 
particular workplace privacy—as a value worth protecting, 
these new technologies will be upon us before we are ready 
for them. Weighing these issues will allow us to be the 
masters of technology, instead of its slaves.173 
                                                          
169 139 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Simon). 
170 137 CONG. REC. S2430 (daily ed., Feb. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Simon). 
171 Id. Also the International Labour Organization (ILO), adopted The ILO 
Code: The Standard for Workers’ Rights, a basic set of employee protections 
which include: 
Coverage for both public and private sector employees; That employees 
should have notice of data collection processes; That data should be 
collected and used lawfully and fairly . . . That data should be used for 
reasons directly relevant to employment . . . That data should be held 
securely; That workers should have access to data . . . That workers 
cannot waive their privacy rights . . . . 
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, Workplace Privacy, available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/workplace. 
172 Kristen B. DeTienne, The Boss’s Eyes and Ears: A Case Study of 
Electronic Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers and Workers 
Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 93, 98 (1996). 
173 139 CONG. REC. S6122, S6123 (daily ed., May 19, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Simon). 
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At the end of the 1993 Congressional term, the PCWA died in 
committee in both houses and has yet to be introduced.174 
3. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act175 
Ten years after the failed attempt to pass the PWCA, Senator 
Charles Schumer and Representative Charles Candy introduced the 
NEMA in 2000.176 This bill also failed to receive a vote on the 
floors of both houses of Congress.177 Under NEMA, any 
“employer who intentionally, by any electronic means, reads, 
listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire communication, oral 
communication, or electronic communication of an employee, 
without first having provided the employee notice . . . shall be 
liable to the employee for relief.”178 The notice requirement would 
be satisfied so long as the employer told the employees which 
communications or computer uses would be monitored, how the 
monitoring would take place, and how the information obtained 
would be maintained.179 Furthermore, employers would be 
required to disclose the monitoring and collection of “non-work 
related information.”180 This provision would have also allowed 
employees to seek damages in federal courts for violations.181 
Specifically, employers would be liable for attorney’s fees, 
punitive and actual damages, and other costs, with the total not 
exceeding $500,000, should the employee be successful in a 
lawsuit against the employer for a NEMA violation.182 
Both federal and state governments have begun to make strides 
in limiting how, when, and why monitoring takes places. The 
actual notice of when and where monitoring takes place as 
afforded by some states, is a first step in affording workers 
                                                          
174 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19. 
175 H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000). 
176 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19. 
177 See H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000). 
178 Id. at 277(a)(1). 
179 See id. 
180 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 19. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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adequate protections at work, yet still does nothing to help 
determine property rights over personal electronic documents 
created or maintained on a corporate computer network. However, 
until a unified national policy is in place, states will attempt to fill 
in the gap, and in the absence of no legislation, companies alone 
are left to set their own individual surveillance policies. Just as 
guidance exists for the federal government and its employees, 
some form of unifying policy must come into existence. 
IV. AN EXAMPLE WITHIN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: HAYNES V. OFFICE 
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL183 
Government employees maintain a privacy right over their 
personal belongings at the workplace.184 When analyzing 
government employees’ privacy rights, courts engage in a Fourth 
Amendment analysis.185 However, this Fourth Amendment 
analysis only applies to public sector employees.186 Private sector 
employees can not claim Fourth Amendment violations when their 
private employers seize their electronic documents.187 
O’Connor v. Ortega188 provides the groundwork for analyzing 
a government employee’s inherent privacy and property rights over 
his or her computer and contents when juxtaposed against classical 
Fourth Amendment analyses. Under O’Connor, employees in the 
government sector may gain a full expectation of privacy over their 
work, if similar expectations of privacy existed when the document 
was first created.189 The expectation of privacy is even further 
bolstered if the document is stored under conditions where access 
is granted only to selected users.190 
The O’Connor framework begins with the Fourth Amendment, 
which guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in the 
                                                          
183 2005 WL 2704956 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2005). 
184 Id. 
185 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
186 See e.g. id. 
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”191  A Fourth Amendment violation is established 
when a “legitimate expectation of privacy”192 exists. To determine 
if a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, a two-part inquiry 
must take place, which requires: (1) a showing of a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the area searched, and (2) an expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.193  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that governmental 
employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but this 
expectation may be reduced by what takes place in the office 
place.194 However, resolving whether or not an expectation of 
privacy exists remains a fact specific problem which must be 
viewed in a reasonable light concerning all of the surrounding 
circumstances of a specific case.195 
An important aspect in determining whether or not an 
expectation of privacy exists involves the use and maintenance of 
computer passwords,196 as well as the general security of an 
employee’s workspace.197 U.S. v. Slanina held that when public 
agencies mandate that their employees use passwords to secure 
their computers and keys to secure their offices, those actions may 
be evidence of a subjective expectation of privacy.198 Further, 
when employers fail to notify employees that their computer use 
can be monitored, in conjunction with the absence of evidence that 
                                                          
191 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
192 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
193 U.S. v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). Further, as with the expectation of privacy in 
one’s home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is “based upon societal 
expectations that have deep roots in the history of the [Fourth] Amendment.” 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n. 8 (1984). 
194 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716-17. The expectation of privacy may be 
limited by such things as office practices and procedures, or by legitimate 
regulation. Id. 
195 Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General Phill Kline, 298 F. Supp. 2d 
1154, 1161 (D. Kan. 2003). 
196 See supra note 15, for a further discussion concerning passwords. 
197 U.S. v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2002). 
198 Id. 
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other employees can access each other’s computers,199 the 
employees’ subjective expectation of privacy can rise to an 
objective level of privacy or one that society is prepared to 
recognize.200 
In Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General, Carlus Haynes, a 
former Kansas Assistant Attorney General, sought injunctive relief 
to prevent his former employer, the Kansas Attorney General, from 
accessing his private files on his work computer as well as 
damages.201 Prior to Haynes’ termination he was denied access to 
both personal and work related files which were stored on his 
computer.202 The Haynes court relied on the O’Connor framework 
to determine if an expectation of privacy existed.203 Haynes alleged 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information stored on his 
work computer, and that the search following his termination 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.204 Further, Haynes claimed 
a property interest in the personal information stored on his work 
computer and that the state’s actions in preventing him from 
accessing his personal information deprived “him of property 
                                                          
199 With any computer network, system administrators may have access to 
even password-protected data; however, when this administrator access is not 
routine it only further bolsters an employee’s expectation of privacy. See 
generally id. at 676-77. 
200 Id. 
201 Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956 1. (D. Kan. 
Aug. 26, 2005). 
202 Id. The facts surrounding Haynes’ termination and subsequent denial of 
access are as follows: Haynes was informed that he was going to be fired in two 
weeks. On the same day, Haynes’ supervisor contacted a computer specialist to 
restrict Haynes’ computer access to certain times and to ensure that no data was 
copied. When Haynes accessed his computer and began to copy his personal 
files and work product he was approached by his supervisor and accused of 
stealing. Haynes explained that he was copying his personal files. About an hour 
later, Haynes was summarily terminated, given fifteen minutes to leave and was 
not allowed to take anything with him, including personal items. After his 
termination, certain files on his computer, including personal e-mail messages, 
were viewed by other employees of the Kansas Attorney General. However, 
after several months had passed, Haynes was given access to all of his e-mail 
and documents that remained on his computer. Id. 
203 Id. at 3. 
204 Id. at 1. 
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without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”205 
The court focused mainly on whether or not Haynes’ 
expectation of privacy was indeed reasonable. When Haynes’ 
employment began, he signed the Kansas Attorney General’s 
Office’s Computer Use Procedures,206 which set forth the system’s 
privacy expectations.207 Each time Haynes logged onto his 
computer he was presented with an explicit warning208 informing 
                                                          
205 Id. The Haynes court relied on United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 
1130 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002), to reach its decision. In 
Angevine, the defendant, an “Oklahoma State University professor, had been 
prosecuted for possession of child pornography . . . [and] sought to suppress the 
pornography that had been seized.” Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956 at 2. In this 
instance the defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy because of the following: “(1) the university’s policy that allowed the 
university to audit and monitor Internet use and warned that information flowing 
through the university network was not confidential; (2) the university owned 
the computer and explicitly reserved ownership of data stored within.” Id. 
206 Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956, 2 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 26, 2005). The full policy read as follows: 
Office computer use shall be in compliance with computer use 
procedures. Obtain full procedures from your deputy or supervisor. 
Computer use for non-official business is authorized only if kept to 
minimum duration & frequency & if it does not interfere with state 
business. This system shall not be used unlawfully nor for any purpose 
which could embarrass the user, recipient or Attorney General. There 
shall be no expectation of privacy in using this system; however, 
intentional access to another user’s e-mail without permission shall be 
prohibited, except as authorized by computer use procedures. Despite 
deletion, files may remain available in storage. Personal data on the 
system may be subject to removal. Data may be subject to state public 
records and records preservation laws. User software installation is 
prohibited unless specifically authorized. Software may not be copied 
for use outside this office unless authorized. 
Id. 
207 Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956, 2 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 26, 2005). 
208 Id. at 4. Warning messages reminding employees of the pre-existing 
AUP, have played a significant role in court decisions. See United States v. 
Simons, 206 F. 3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a CIA division’s Internet 
usage policy eliminated a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning file 
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him and all employees that computer use was not confidential, that 
there was no expectation of privacy, and that personal files stored 
on the network could be removed at any time, without notice.209 
Despite Haynes’ password and private workspace, the warning 
conveyed to Haynes each time he used his computer was the 
overwhelming factor in the court’s decision to deny the 
injunction.210 Ultimately, the court found that Haynes did not 
sufficiently demonstrate an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy.211 However, the court did note that the law concerning the 
expectation of privacy is in a state of “flux with the outcome 
heavily dependent upon the particular facts of each case.”212 
Even government employees, as exemplified by the Haynes 
decision, have a difficult task of asserting privacy and property 
rights over their electronic documents. Fourth Amendment 
protections and its afforded heightened level of security, seems to 
do little when companies utilize AUPs and notification procedures. 
Nonetheless, even against a uniform standard of determining how, 
when, and where a right of privacy exists finding a property right 
is an intricate determination to make—for both public and private 
employees. 
V. THE SHMUELI DECISION AND THE FUTURE 
The division between business and personal documents must 
                                                          
transfers, all websites history, and all e-mail); Muick v. Glenayre Electronics, 
280 F. 3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling that an employee has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in laptop files where employer announced it could inspect 
laptops it provides to employees); United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822 
(D. Neb. 2003) (finding that an employee has no reasonable basis to believe 
activities on work computer were private “when, through company’s screen 
notification, they have actual knowledge that the computer can be searched”); 
United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding that a sergeant 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy over his government e-mail account 
because use was reserved for official business and network banner informed 
users upon login that use was subject to monitoring). 
209 Haynes, 2005 WL 2704956 at 4. 
210 Id. at 2. 
211 Id. at 4. 
212 Id. 
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have a clear distinction or both employers and employees will 
suffer significant costs after the employment relationship is 
severed. It is well established that employers electronically 
monitor their employees’ communication. Protections afforded by 
statutes, and notifications provided by AUPs which detail an 
employee’s minimal expectation of privacy, are nominal steps 
toward identifying who maintains property rights over personal 
electronic documents created or maintained on a work computer. 
Current protections afforded by statutes and AUPs are designed to 
ensure the security of proprietary information and employee 
productivity,213 as well as the security of electronic 
communications.214 AUPs and current statutes, however, never 
assign property right protections. Just as an electronic 
communication can be stolen through wiretapping, an electronic 
document can be illegally taken through various surveillance and 
monitoring techniques.215 
Although electronic documents are not communications, they 
are capable of being viewed, copied, and maliciously stolen though 
electronic monitoring. As one journalist observed, 
[t]he commingling of personal and business property on 
company computers [continues to grow] . . . [f]rom 
personal e-mail to screenplays written on the lunch hour, 
employers should anticipate the obligation to identify . . . 
and return personal data ‘belonging’ to fired employees. 
Likewise, employees need to tailor . . . personal use of 
company systems to the possibility of lock out.216 
All employees have notions that after they are fired they will be 
given a cardboard box to collect their personal belongings before 
their final exit. As the issue of electronic property further develops, 
or as employers seek to avoid litigation, society must decide if it 
wants to grant former employees “computer visitation rights,” 
                                                          
213 See supra Part II. 
214 See supra Part III. 
215 See supra Part II.A, which describes the surveillance monitoring 
techniques that take place that give employers the opportunity to take an 
employee’s electronic document. 
216 Craig Ball, Yours, Mine and Ouch!, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Sep. 
2005, available at http://www.craigball.com/BIYC04-092005.pdf 
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which would allow employees a window of opportunity to access 
their computers after they have been terminated.217 When choosing 
to grant visitation rights, certain limitations must be considered. 
For example, if former employees are allowed to “visit” their old 
computers, the company may run the risk of loosing proprietary 
information because the former employee now works for a 
competing firm.218  Conversely, in a scenario where the former 
employer will actually give former employees their personal 
electronic documents, employees must ask if they want their old 
employer going through their former computer, sifting personal 
from work product.219 
Legislation and case law currently guide employees and 
employers as to the particulars of copyright, trademark or patent 
infringement, or the theft of trade secrets.220  Further, restrictive 
covenants and acceptable use policies entered into between 
employers and employees can affect the property relationship.221 
Nonetheless, if an employee were to use the company’s computer 
for personal matters, such as writing a novel, during a non-paid 
lunch hour, no guidance beyond the likely employer-slanted AUP 
exists to protect the employee’s property rights over his or her 
personal material.222 Under Shmueli, if an employer was to 
unlawfully take an independent contractor’s personal printed 
document, conversion applies.223  This same remedy does not 
apply to electronic documents because no statutory protections are 
provided for the benefit of the privately employed worker.224 To 




220 Trade secret protection is extended to “any formula, pattern, device or 
compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives 
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or 
use it.”  Ashland Mgt. Inc. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.S.2d 912, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1993) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 757, comment b (1993)). Patent, 
trademark, and copyright protection will not be discussed in this Note. 
221 See supra Part II.C. 
222 See supra Part II.C. 
223 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
224 See supra Part III. 
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avoid the possible usurpation of employee property rights, some 
legal experts contend that laws should be passed which limit the 
conditions and circumstances of monitoring and thereby protect 
private sector employees’ property interest over their electronic 
documents.225 
In order to avoid lawsuits by former employees over the 
property interests in the employees’ personal electronic documents, 
it would benefit employers to follow a set policy that allows both 
employers and employees to maintain control over the documents 
that rightfully belong to each respective party. Although a policy 
may exist which assigns property rights, this policy still does not 
resolve the problem presented by Shmueli, which provides no 
direction for employees who have had their personal electronic 
documents taken by their employers. 
Similar to the problems Sarit Shmueli faced when her private 
files were taken by her employer, employees who are denied 
access to documents stored on their computers have few remedies. 
Furthermore, because an employer can monitor, see, and even copy 
what an employee does on his or her company computer,226 an 
employee has essentially no avenues of redress when personal files 
stored on the company computer have been copied, taken, 
monitored or logged without the employee’s knowledge or 
consent. 
VI. DOES THE ANSWER REST IN PRIVACY? STATUTORY 
PROTECTION? OR BOTH? 
A middle line must be drawn which protects business interests 
as well as personal privacy and property rights. As more and more 
people rely on computers to perform their work tasks, society faces 
a conundrum—whether or not to extend privacy rights into the 
realm of the work computer. Congressional legislative history227 as 
well as strides made at the state level,228 have recognized a desire 
                                                          
225 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92, at 1. 
226 See supra Part II.A. 
227 See supra Part III.B. 
228 See supra Part III.A. 
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to extend a level of privacy onto an employee’s work computer. 
This privacy interest must be defined in a consistent national 
policy that will guide both employers and employees. Reasoning-
by-interpolation, or penumbral reasoning, provides one possible 
answer to the problem. In balancing a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the workplace229 against the need for monitoring,230 any 
real solution must confront the following paradox: 
If an employee knows that his employer engages in 
electronic eavesdropping, he has no subjective expectation 
of privacy because he knows that his employer can 
intercept every word he utters. Thus, by notifying 
employees that eavesdropping is taking place, employers 
can effectively negate employees’ claims to privacy in the 
workplace under the traditional justifiable-expectation-of-
privacy analysis.231 
Currently, when the two needs are pitted against one another, an 
employee’s expectation of privacy is destroyed in favor of the 
company’s need to monitor. A solution must be found which 
preserves both interests. 
Penumbral reasoning is the “drawing of logical inferences by 
looking at relevant parts of the Constitution as a whole and their 
relationship to one another.”232 Although the analogy is not direct, 
it does provide a basis for interpolation. When an employee’s 
security right over his or her communications and his or her to 
right privacy in the workplace are placed against one another, as 
this Note proposes, in the overlap a property right over electronic 
                                                          
229 See supra Part IV. 
230 See supra Part II.A. 
231 Jonathan J. Green, Electronic Monitoring In the Workplace: The Need 
For Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438, 445 (1984). 
232 Denning, supra note 8, at 1092. 
In most judges’ and scholars’ minds, the premier contemporary 
example of penumbral reasoning is Griswold. In Griswold, Justice 
Douglas looked at various provisions of the Bill of Rights, include 
those that protect assembly, freedom from self-incrimination . . . 
From this survey, he inferred that there was a common thread 
throughout that government could not intrude into the privacy of 
individuals absent fairly compelling circumstances. 
Id. 
JACOBS MACROED 07-30-06.DOC 7/30/2006  12:36 PM 
 PENUMBRAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 875 
documents is generated. 
Current statutory protections, both at the state and federal 
levels, grant public and private employees security over their 
electronic communications.233 Case law provides the proposition 
that an expectation of privacy exists at work.234 Furthermore, 
corporate practices support and recognize this notion as well 
through their use of blanket statements235 utilized in AUPs. If an 
employee had no right of privacy at work, these statements would 
not be necessary, they only serve to negate an employee’s 
affirmative right to privacy in the workplace which effectively 
removes the traditional privacy expectation. 
Returning to the novel written during an employee’s lunch 
hour using work resources, or even Sarit Shmueli’s client-list, in 
the spaces where privacy and the security of electronic 
communications overlap, a property right appears to exist. This 
property right is founded in the preexisting affirmative right of 
privacy and the secured protection over their electronic 
communications. Therefore, as this Note suggests when an 
employee is able to create a personal electronic document at work, 
he or she maintains a property right over that document. 
VII. SUGGESTED POLICY 
Solutions to this problem can be found on two fronts—through 
legislation and the continued use of AUPs. Currently, the ECPA236 
is the only national guideline that employers can follow. 
Unfortunately, this statute is flawed and insufficient to protect an 
employee’s work at the modern company. Additionally, most 
current AUP contracts fail to address any property rights 
                                                          
233 See supra Part III. In order for an employer to violate an employee’s 
protection, an employer must notify the employee. Therefore, the right remains 
with the employee, and can only be legally violated with the employee’s 
consent. 
234 See supra Part IV. 
235 See supra notes 116, 196 and 201 for a further discussion concerning 
explicit warnings given to users concerning expectations of privacy in the 
workplace. 
236 See supra Part III.B.3. 
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employees may have over their personal electronic documents.237 
Effective AUPs must be drafted which will appropriately guide 
employers in how and when they monitor their employees in light 
of current technology, and the inherent property right employees 
maintain in their personal electronic documents.238 
A. Statutory Solution 
With the continued evolution of technology, any protections 
afforded by the ECPA have become practically irrelevant.239 First, 
the ECPA does not apply to forms of surveillance technologies 
such as electronic mail monitoring, Internet monitoring, and video 
surveillance.240 Also, because the ECPA requires an active 
interception of a communication, viewing communications and 
documents that are stored on a computer or file server is not a 
violation.241 Additionally, aside from piecemeal state regulation, 
the ECPA as a national standard benchmark “does not require an 
employer to give notice of electronic monitoring practices, nor is 
there any other [federal] statute that requires an employer to give 
notice of monitoring practices, no matter how invasive the 
monitoring may be.”242 
If a secured privacy and property right is guaranteed at work, 
then an employee would maintain an inherent right over 
expressions created at work, utilizing work resources. The 
protections afforded by Florida, Connecticut and Delaware provide 
                                                          
237 See supra Part II.C. 
238 The main thrust of this policy is not to decide when and how to monitor 
employees, but on how to secure an employee’s property in his or her electronic 
documents. 
239 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 15. 
240 Id. See supra Part II.A for a further discussion of surveillance 
technologies used. Under the ECPA an employer is permitted to utilize these 
methods. 
241 See ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18. U.S.C.). The ECPA only applies when 
active interception takes place. Documents stored in a passive state, like 
Shmueli’s contact list, are not protected from copying or taking under this 
statute. See NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142. 
242 NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 15. 
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a solid basis for how, where, and why surveillance should take 
place; however, these laws insufficiently protect an employee’s 
property right over his or her electronic documents. Under these 
statutory frameworks, when an employee assents to the monitoring 
and in the course of the surveillance, an employee’s document is 
copied—the employee will never be able to assert property interest 
over the documents because the notice negated any and all 
property rights. Any statutory solution must include provisions that 
protect an employee’s property interest. A statutory solution must 
secure employees’ property rights over their documents so rigidly 
that it can never be signed away through an AUP or negated 
through notification standards. Thus, if an employee were to write 
the next great American novel on a computer at work, it would 
never be owned by his or her employer. 
The proposed PCWA of 1990 appears to be the best 
springboard to form a sound national policy. Under the PCWA, 
employers would have to inform all employees, even prospective 
ones, of all the monitoring that takes place in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the PCWA would guarantee an employee’s rights 
over their First Amendment expressions, for instance the Great 
American novel written during a non-paid lunch hour. However, 
the PCWA does nothing to protect documents that are taken 
without an employee’s knowledge.243 In order “to protect 
employees’ privacy rights, uniform standards must be set to govern 
monitoring of employees’ communications . . . [in light of] current 
technological capabilities.”244  Therefore, the uniform statutory 
standard must include notice, audit, and remedies. 
Notice will involve a two-part standard. The Delaware Notice 
of Monitoring Act is a good starting point for analysis.245 First, 
                                                          
243 Justice Cahn states that an owner does not forfeit his ownership for 
failure to take good care of intangible personal property any more than he 
forfeits it for failure to take good care of his watch. Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 
802 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (Sup. Ct. 2005). Therefore, an employee should be 
afforded the same protections when his belongings are taken without his 
knowledge. In essence, how can a man call the police to report a stolen watch, 
when he didn’t know it was gone in the first place? 
244 Green, supra note 231, at 457. 
245 19 DEL. C. § 705 (2005). See supra Part III.A for a further discussion. 
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employees must be informed of how, when, and why monitoring 
will take place. It must be recognized that employees are at work 
to work for their employer, not to toil on their own personal 
ventures, such as web-surfing, e-mailing, or even writing the next 
great American novel. If an employee is able to create personal 
work incidental to required tasks, the employer must concede that 
the personal work is the property of the employee. Second, if 
continuous active monitoring takes place as described, pop-up 
notification, similar to the one at issue in Haynes,246 must be 
displayed every time users login into their computers informing 
them that active monitoring is taking place. 
The data and information collected as a result of monitoring 
must be subject to audit and review. This facet has not been 
addressed by any other previous legislative attempts. Employers 
must be allowed to access the data collected upon the showing of 
an appropriate and reasonable request. Furthermore, just as 
employers are required to report tax and benefit summaries to 
employees, they must also include summaries of what information 
or personal documents have been collected. 
If employees should discover that their electronic documents 
have been taken without their knowledge, appropriate remedies 
must be available. First, the inherent property right that employees 
have over their documents must be recognized. Without an 
acknowledgement of the inherent property right that employees 
maintain in documents, employees would not have the benefit of 
suing for conversion. In addition, employees must be able to seek 
appropriate compensatory damages as suggested by the proposed 
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000.247 Under NEMA, 
employees could sue for actual and punitive damages, and other 
fees, up to $500,000.248 
                                                          
246 Haynes v. Attorney General of Kansas, 2005 WL 2704956 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 26, 2005). See supra note 205-208 for a further discussion of other types 
of pop-up notifications. 
247 H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2000). See supra Part III.B.3 for a 
further discussion. 
248 Id. 
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B. Private Solution 
Despite the lack of statutory guidance concerning electronic 
documents in the workplace, business must continue to function. In 
light of the Shmueli249 decision, and in the absence of a national 
statutory framework that recognizes an employee’s property right, 
employers must continue to provide employees with AUPs. 
Current industry standards detailing how employees assent to an 
AUP must continue to be followed.250 Under current federal law, 
employers are not required to provide their employees with an 
AUP251—those that do, do so to satisfy state requirements252 or out 
of their own initiative.253 
Until a national policy is in place, companies should continue 
to provide their employees with AUPs, understanding that 
employees maintain an inherent property right over their personal 
electronic documents. Any unified policy should and will 
recognize an organization’s need to monitor to protect company 
assets and ensure employee productivity. However, current AUPs 
do nothing to help determine ownership over an electronic 
document.254 Rather, current AUPs only make blanket statements 
stating that company assets such as computers should be used 
solely for business purposes.255 Nevertheless, studies have proven 
that employees are using their work computers for personal 
purposes.256 Therefore, if employees maintain an inherent property 
right over their personal electronic documents and employees are 
indeed creating these documents at work, AUPs must address this 
issue. 
Under current law, as in Shmueli’s holding alone, employees 
are able to sue for conversion.257 At the very least, AUPs must 
                                                          
249 Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
250 See supra Part II.C. 
251 See supra Part III.B. 
252 See supra Part III.A. 
253 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 92. 
254 See supra Part III.C. 
255 See Porter, supra note 95. 
256 See supra Part II.A. 
257 See Shmueli v. Corcoran Group, 802 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2005). 
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address this problem or companies risk litigation exposure. 
Ultimately, an AUP should include the same suggestions as 
discussed previously under a suggested statutory solution, such as 
notice and audit. Crucially, AUPs should protect the company, 
while providing adequate notice to the employee of when and why 
electronic monitoring is taking place, while recognizing an 
employee’s property right over their electronic documents. 
Employees should not be given a blanket right to do what they 
wish while at work—employees should still be subject to 
disciplinary actions if they are found to violate fundamental 
precepts of their work agreement or the AUP.258 Employers, 
however, must recognize that if an employee is able to write the 
great American novel utilizing work resources, while still 
satisfying work requirements, in order to protect the company from 
suit exposure and other increased expenses, an AUP must 
recognize the employee’s property right over those documents. 
CONCLUSION 
As computer use in the workplace continues to grow, checks 
must be put into place which balance a company’s need to monitor 
their employees and control their trade secret and other proprietary 
information against an employee’s inherent property right over 
their personal electronic documents. Current federal and state 
statutes insufficiently secure this right. Although privately drafted 
AUPs protect the corporation, they do little to protect employees. 
Shmueli illustrates the first official step toward recognizing an 
employee’s property right over their documents that is grounded in 
the overlap between privacy and the security of electronic 
communications. A national policy must recognize this right, but 
until then, employers must protect themselves by creating adequate 
AUPs to guard the interests of all parties. Employees must satisfy 
their work requirements—that is what they are paid to do—not 
write the great American novel. However, if an employee is able to 
do both, policy, either statutory or privately driven, must reflect the 
employee’s property interest. 
                                                          
258 See Porter, supra note 95. 
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